The curtain opened on what a navy admiral involved in the Scorpion incident would later describe as one of the greatest unsolved sea mysteries of our era. The 2. Atlantic Ocean. For four decades, the navy and U. S. intelligence communities have revealed little about the facts of the Scorpion sinking, citing the need to protect military secrets. The full account of its loss has continued to elude and frustrate researchers, journalists, and family members of the 9. But a careful reexamination of the public recordas well as interviews with former U. S. and Soviet military officials, men involved in the search for the sub, and sailors stationed on Polaris missile submarines on patrol in 1. Instead, it may have been the outcome of a deadly Cold War confrontation between the U. S. and the Soviet Union that both sides chose to bury at the bottom of the sea. As documented in press accounts, U. S. Navy situation reports, and the official court of inquiry convened to probe the incident, by nightfall on that Memorial Day, Atlantic Fleet commander Admiral Ephraim P. Holmes had ordered what would become the largest U. S. naval operation since the Cuban Missile Crisis six years earlier. Officials announced that Vice Admiral Arnold F. Schade, the Atlantic Submarine Force commander, was out at sea in the Atlantic in the Connecticut based nuclear attack submarine USS Pargo SSN 6. Virginia Capes to organize a search of the shallow waters off the East Coast. Meanwhile, the first members of what would become a task force of nearly sixty ships and submarines and dozens of land based patrol aircraft raced into the Atlantic that Monday night to search for the missing sub. For nine days the searchers scoured the ocean from the continental shelf to the Azores, looking for any sign of Scorpion. They failed to find a single clue. Nine days later, on June 5, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chief of naval operations, declared that both submarine and crew were presumed lost. Throughout June and July 1. Scorpion investigations proceeded on parallel paths. A small group of scientific research and support ships headed by the oceanographic research vessel USNS Mizar T AGOR 1. Azores that scientists had identified by examining underwater signals that they believed came from the submarines sinking at 1. Z GMT on Wednesday, May 2. In Norfolk a seven member court of inquiry convened on June 5 to probe Scorpions disappearance. In his message appointing retired Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin president of the Scorpion investigation, Admiral Holmes set out the inquests mission The Court is directed to inquire into all the facts and circumstances connected with the disappearance of the Scorpion death of, or injuries to personnel aboardand to fix responsibility for the incident. After deliberation, the Court shall submit its findings of fact, opinions and recommendations. The seven member panel had legal powers equivalent to those of a civilian grand jury, and the authority to review classified information up to the level of top secret. Its mandate did not include determining criminal guilt or innocence. The courts chief function was to determine the facts. During eleven weeks of hearingsmost of them closed to the press and public due to the classified information under examinationthe court took sworn testimony from ninety witnesses and reviewed 2. By mid August, the court had scoured the submarines operational and administrative history, reviewed detailed records of its two shipyard overhaul periods since joining the fleet in 1. Mediterranean deployment, and received updates on Mizars ongoing technical search in the eastern Atlantic. After huddling for two weeks, the panel completed an initial report of over eighteen hundred pagesclassified top secret at the timethat Admiral Austin submitted to the navys uniformed leadership for review. Two months later came stunning news On October 3. Mizar had found the wreckage of Scorpion. A towed sled gliding fifteen feet above the ocean floor at the end of a three mile cable had photographed the subs broken hull. Several thousand images of the site were rushed back to the United States, where the hastily reconvened court of inquiry met with navy photo analysts to see if the new evidence might lead them to a firm conclusion as to what had caused Scorpions destruction. On January 3. 1, 1. In effect, Admiral Austin and his fellow panelists had thrown up their hands. Their conclusion The certain cause of the loss of Scorpion cannot be ascertained by any evidence now available. For the Scorpion families and many navy personnel, the courts findings were a major disappointment. The court did rule out foul play, an underwater collision with an undersea mountain, and a reactor malfunction, and expressed confidence in the crews training, the submarines overall material condition, and the safety of its torpedoes. By implication, the court let stand an unstated premise that some unconfirmed mechanical malfunction had sent the submarine plunging to the Atlantic abyssal plain two miles down. For fifteen years afterward, that was the extent of what the navy, submarine service, Scorpion families, and the public knew about what had happened to the sub and its crew. Citing the operational requirements of the nuclear submarine force and the sensitivity of all information on the Skipjack class submarines capabilities, the navy kept the Scorpion archive locked away in a top secret vault. However, when I talked with Admiral Schade, the retired Atlantic Submarine Force commander, fifteen years after Scorpions mysterious demise, he lifted a corner of the navys opaque security cloak that had long concealed most details of the incident. In an interview for a fifteenth anniversary retrospective article on the tragedy, Schade offered up details of events in May 1.